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Abstract
We use a non-linear hedonic model to estimate the implicit marginal prices of 17 local
public goods in a Paris suburban area on an original data set of some 8200 housing units.
The results reveal a robust eﬀect of local public school quality (mesured both by the fraction
of junior high school students that are at least 2 years behind grade level and the stu-
dent/teacher ratio) on house prices. It is observed that housing owners’ marginal willingness
to pay for reducing commuting time is roughly similar for public transportation than for car
transportation. Another noticeable result is the complete capitalization of local taxes at a
discount rate of 3,5%. An illustration of the potential usefulness of the results for Cost-Benefit
analysis is also provided.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that if a good is traded in a competitive market, the social value of a ‘small’
additional quantity of the good is measured by its market price, if the initial distribution of
wealth, which gives rise to the competitive equilibrium, is considered optimal. A problem that
arises when one wants to apply this principle to the evaluation of ‘small’ public projects is
that most goods supplied by such projects (such as quality of public schools, public parks, etc.)
are not directly traded on competitive markets. Either for their intrinsic property (non-rivalry
in consumption and non-excludability) or for exogenous political reasons, they belong to the
category of public goods. How can the authority in charge of producing these goods obtain the
relevant information about their social value ?
When public goods are local, the ‘hedonic’ or - more revealingly -implicit price theory pop-
ularized by Rosen (1974) provides an answer to that question. Recall that hedonic price theory
views a housing as a bundle of utility-bearing characteristics, some of which being the public
goods to which the occupation of the house give access. Accordingly, this theory interprets the
price of a house as the market evaluation, by a hedonic price function, of the particular package
of characteristics embodied in it. Although local public goods themselves are not traded on
competitive markets, units of housing which give access to these local public goods are. Like for
private goods, therefore, the increase in housing price brought about by a “small” increase in
the quantity of a public good can be interpreted as the marginal social value of this public good
and be used as such in cost-benefit analysis (see e.g. Scotchmer (1985; 1986) and Kanemoto
(1988) for a complete discussion of the use of hedonic prices in cost-benefit analysis)1.
1The local character of the information conveyed by empirical estimates of a hedonic price function, to which we
stick in the present paper, is worth emphasizing. Only under very specific assumptions (such as those considered
2
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Empirical estimations of housing hedonic prices functions including local public goods have
been abundant in North America in the last thirty years (see Kiel and McClain (1996) or
Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) for example). They have been much more rare in Europe (see
however Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) and Ginsburgh and Waelbroeck (1998)) and this paper
is primarily intended as a contribution toward closing the huge gap that separates North America
from Europe in terms of empirical knowledge of the value attached by citizens to specific local
public goods. In our view, improving knowledge on this matter in Europe is a necessary step
in understanding the diﬀerences between Europe and North America in terms of public good
provision and financing.
A particular area where this comparison is likely to be instructive is education. Many hedonic
studies performed in the United States2 have found a significant negative relationship between
the housing price and the pupil/teacher ratio at local public schools. This ratio is interpreted
as an indicator of the “objective” input devoted into the children’s human capital production
process by the public authorities. However, it is certainly not the only input of the human capital
production function. Another input, which has been the object of a an important theoretical
and empirical literature3 is the quality of the ‘peers’ with whom the pupil interacts. However
the American public school system makes the observed negative relationship between housing
prices and pupil/teacher ratios somewhat diﬃcult to interpret. This diﬃculty arises because,
in the United States, public schools are managed and partially or wholly financed at the local
(county or state) level. As a result, the across-county diﬀerences in public subsidies received
in Bartik (1987)) can an estimation of the hedonic price function provide global information on preferences and
technology. A thorough discussion of these issues is provided in Ekeland et al (2004).
2See for instance Bogart and Cromwell (1997) and Black (1999).
3See e.g. Arnott and Rowse (1987), Hanuscheck (1986).
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by schools tend to be heavily correlated with the sociological characteristics of the counties.
For this reason an observed relationship between housing prices and pupil/teacher ratios in the
United States could in part reflect a concern for avoiding bad peers rather than a preference for
smaller class sizes per se. Ideally, one would like to disentangle the household’s valuation of the
relative impact of the two inputs on human capital accumulation.
Our data set and the institutional framework of the public school system in France enables
us to decompose these diﬀering eﬀects to some extent. The public school system is managed
by the central government which pursues an egalitarian aim. As a result, diﬀerences between
the public subsidies received by diﬀerent schools are small and they tend to be slightly biased
in favor of the relatively poor cities. These institutional features of the French public school
system suggest that cross-cities variations in the pupil/teacher ratio are less likely to be related
to variations in the quality of the ‘peer group’ in France than in the U.S. As it happens, our
data contains a plausible indicator of the academic quality of the peers that a given pupil will
encounter when attending local public school and hence enable us to disentangle the peer group
eﬀects from the input eﬀect.
Another kind of local public good that is likely to be valued diﬀerently in Europe and in
the US is public transportation. In Paris outskirts, 50% of inhabitants go to work by car,
28% use public transportation and 12% use both systems.4 These figures are typically much
higher than in US metropolitan areas. As it turns out, very few empirical hedonic studies have
included variables that measure access to public or private transportation network. Given the
role devoted to transportation in standard urban theory (see e.g. Fujita 1999), this neglect is
somewhat surprising.
4Source: INSEE census 1999.
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We provide in this paper an estimation of a hedonic price function on an original data set of
some 8200 observations on individual dwelling prices collected from the 33 largest cities of Val
d’Oise (an administrative area that counts 1 million of inhabitants in the north-west of Paris)
over the 1985-1993 period. By contrast to many studies in the literature, we include a large
number (17) of public goods, among which are the quality of local public schools (measured
both by the fraction of junior high school students that are at least 2 years behind grade
level and the student/teacher ratio), geographical characteristics (distance from Roissy airport,
geographic elevation of the location, the fraction of the city’s area devoted to recreational land,
etc.) and cultural/commercial infrastructure (number of historical buildings, playground fields,
retail stores, public entertainment centers, etc. relative to the number of inhabitants). Also
included are local tax rates on housing as well as measures of the commuting time (both by
public transportation and by car) during rush hour. We also have at our disposal information
on many housing-specific characteristics such as the size of the housing, the availability of a
balcony, an equipped kitchen, and the like.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we sketch the theoretical
model. In the third section, we present our data set and the estimation method. The results
are discussed and interpreted in the fourth section. The fifth section uses our hedonic estimates
to examine an actual expenditure program designed by the French government to reduce school
delinquencies in a few cities covered by our sample and recall the conditions that enable one
to interpret partial derivatives of housing prices with respect to public goods characteristics as
marginal social values of the public goods. The sixth section concludes.
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2 Theoretical model
The model described here is standard and is presented for the sake of completeness. Consider the
problem of a household who chooses a quantity of a perfectly divisible private good (say money)
and exactly one unit of housing. Alternative units of housing are assumed to be completely
diﬀerentiated by their content inK implicit (but observable) characteristics. As in Rosen (1974),
a unit of housing can thus be thought of as a vector in the non-negative orthant of the K-
dimensional Euclidean space. It is further assumed that the number and variety of diﬀerent
cities and housing units is suﬃciently large for the choice among city-specific and housing-
specific characteristics to be assumed continuous ‘for all practical purposes’ (Rosen (1974)).
This assumption is rather stringent in the context of location choice and should, at best, be seen
as an approximation. The interpretation given to the empirical model estimated in this paper
would not hold if the choice among alternative housing units was assumed to be discrete.
Let X denote the (closed and convex) set of all conceivable packages of the K character-
istics. The household’s preferences for the various combinations of private goods and housing
characteristics are represented by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable strongly quasi-concave and
weakly increasingly monotonic utility function U : X→ R+ with image u. Every unit of housing
with combination of characteristics c ∈ RK+ has a market price which can be thought of as the
image of c under a function h : RK+ → R+. The function h is commonly referred to as a hedonic
price function. It assigns a price to every unit of housing as a function of its characteristics.
We assume that h is strictly monotonically increasing and diﬀerentiable with respect to every
characteristic. The household is assumed to act on the premises that h is given and independent
from its location and housing-specific package choice.5
5Questions related to the existence and interpretation of h(.) in a (spatial) general equilibrium with production
6
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Taking the private good as the numéraire, and assuming that the household is initially
endowed with y units of the private good, the decision problem faced by the household is:
max
(c,x)
U(c, x)
subject to
x+ h(c) ≤ y and (c, x) ∈ X (1)
where x ∈ R+ denote the quantity of private good consumed by the household. Assuming that
X ∩ {(c, x) ∈ RK+1+ : x+ h(c) ≤ y} has a non-empty interior in RK+1+ and given the properties
of h and X, it is clear that this program has a solution. A solution (c∗, x∗) satisfies the first
order conditions
∂U(c∗, x∗)
∂ck
∂U(c∗, x∗)
∂x
=
∂h(c∗)
∂ck
(2)
for every characteristic k chosen in strictly positive quantity in the interior of X. As usual, the
left hand side of this equation is the marginal rate of substitution between the kth characteristic
and the private good. It gives the maximal quantity of private good that the household is willing
to give up in order to have access to an additional (arbitrarily small) amount of the kth charac-
teristic. It gives the household’s marginal willingness to pay for the kth characteristic which, at
the households’ optimal choice, is equal to the hedonic price ∂h(c
∗)
∂ck
of this kth characteristic.
3 Empirical implementation of the model
Since theory oﬀers no guidance with respect to the form of the function h it is important to allow
for some flexibility in the choice of the empirical functional form (see e.g. Cropper et al. (1988)
are beyond the scope of this paper and are not addressed. The reader may consult Mas-Colell (1975) and Ellikson
(1979).
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or Rasmussen and Zuehlke (1990) for further discussion on the issue). We do so by specifying a
Box-Cox (1964) transformation of the dependant variable.6 The empirical model we estimate is
therefore, for every observation j = 1, ...,N,
pj(λ) =
KX
k=1
βkckj + εj (3)
with
pj(λ) =
pλj − 1
λ
if λ 6= 0
= ln pj otherwise
where
pj denotes the price of the unit of housing j,
ckj denotes the quantity of the kth characteristics possessed by the jth housing (with the
convention that c1j = c1i = 1 for all i, j = 1, ..., N), and
εj is a random term assumed to be identically, normally and independently distributed across
observations with mean 0 and variance σ2i = σ
2
j = σ
2 for all i,j.
We shall later on refer to pj(λ) as to the transformed price.
The empirical function (3) enables one to calculate easily the first and second derivatives of
the price with respect to the various characteristics. From (3), the first partial derivative of the
housing price with respect to the kth characteristic in observation j is given by
∂pj
∂ck
= βkp
1−λ
j (4)
which implies that the kth characteristic is a positive amenity if βk is positive. The second
partial derivative is given by
6See however Dickie, Delorme and Humphreys (1997) for statistical evidence that flexibility of Box-Cox trans-
formations of the dependant variable in hedonic analysis may not be as large as one would like.
8
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∂2pj
∂c2k
= (1− λ)β2kp1−2λj (5)
which implies that as long as λ is smaller than 1, the hedonic function is convex with respect to
each characteristic, whatever the sign of βk.
We estimate (3) by maximum likelihood.7 As shown by Dagenais and Dufour (1991) for
general non-linear models and Spitzer (1984) for Box-Cox ones, hypothesis-testing by mean of
standard Wald criteria (Student tests) or Lagrange multiplier techniques is not invariant to
measurement units. Likelihood ratio tests do not suﬀer from this problem. On the other hand
likelihood ratio tests do not lead easily to confidence intervals. We therefore present significancy
tests based on the likelihood principle and 95% confidence interval based on the Student dis-
tribution. The later requires a correct computation of the variance covariance matrix of the
parameter estimates. In order to do that, we resort to a double length artificial regression (see
e.g. Davidson and McKinnon (1993) Chapter 14 pp.492-499 for a thorough explanation of this
method).
3.1 Data
The estimation of (3) requires micro data on housing prices, housing specific characteristics and
amenity characteristics. The relative scarcity of reliable housing data sources in France pushed
us to build up our own data set. We limit the study to the sales housing market (rental market
is not considered) and to the administrative area of Val d’Oise in the northern part of Paris
greater metropolitan area, west of Roissy international airport (see figure 1 in Appendix). In
order to obtain reliable information on local public goods we further restrict ourselves to the 33
7Thorough explanations of estimation method can be found in Hyde (1999).
9
Page 10 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
cities of the Val d’Oise that had at least 10000 inhabitants in the 1990 national census.
This limits the variability in the public goods characteristics. For this reason, we spread the
collection of data on individual housing prices in each of these 33 cities on a 9 years period (more
precisely 1985-1993). For each city and for every year, data on local public goods, measured
at the city level, were obtained from the relevant local public authorities. Data on housing
prices were collected from adds taken from free advertising local newspapers. These adds record
information on individual prices, the city where the housing is built, as well as on many housing-
specific characteristics (e.g. the number of rooms, the presence of a parking lot, an equipped
kitchen, etc.). Overall, 8192 observations were collected, allocated between the 33 cities and the
9 years according to the demographic weight of each city in the area.
There are at least three criticisms that one could make to our data set construction.
First, the spreading of the observations over 9 years raises the question of the intertempo-
ral stability of the hedonic price function h. We have addressed this issue by introducing time
dummies in the list of regressors. The spreading of observations over time raises also some inter-
pretative questions with respect to the relationship between housing’s price at some period and
the characteristic of the housing at that and subsequent periods. Clearly, the K characteristics
of a housing should be distinguished by the time and, if necessary, the state of the world in
which they are made available. When buying a dwelling, a household cares about the package
of hedonic characteristics provided by the dwelling during the year of purchase but, also, during
all subsequent years of existence of the dwelling. Yet, in the empirical specification (3) of the
hedonic price function presented above, we explain the price of a particular housing at some year
only by the value taken by the considered characteristics at that same year. This way of doing
would be adequate if households purchasers were either holding stationary expectations about
10
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the future quantities of characteristics or holding rational expectations under the additional
assumption that housing characteristics are random walks.
Second, one must note that the prices recorded in the data base are advertised - or supply -
prices. Yet these advertised prices may behave diﬀerently from the housing prices at which units
of housing were actually traded. Using advertised - rather than transaction - prices would not
bias the estimation if the discrepancies between advertized and actual price were independent
from the characteristics of the dwelling. Yet, we have no way to empirically verify whether this
independence holds. Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) also use supply prices in their hedonic study.
They send to the advertisers of their sample a questionnaire three months after the collection
of the data to obtain additional information on the actual price at which the dwelling units
were sold (if they were). They report a rate of response of some 40% and, for the houses that
happened to be sold during the three months period, an average transaction price that is within a
1% interval of the average advertized price. Although the housing market considered in Cheshire
and Sheppard is somewhat diﬀerent from that considered here, their results suggest at least that,
if it exists at all, the bias associated with the use of advertized price is not excessive.8
Third, the city level at which all amenities are measured may be considered inappropriate.
As discussed at length in the literature, it would be preferable to measure public good and
neighborhood variables at the finest level of observability. Unfortunately, our data set does not
allow for performing an analysis at a smaller level than the city one. Information on housing
units does not typically mention the neighborhood in which the unit is built. Moreover, many
8It should also be noticed that advertized prices have one advantage over transaction prices reported to notaries:
They are not subject to such understatements as reported transaction prices can be. In France, understatement
of transaction prices reported to notaries is common as they enable the parties to reduce their tax payments (in
France, housing purchase is taxed at a rate of some 8%).
11
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public amenities variables (e.g. tax rates) are only available at the city level.9
3.2 Variables
The list, description and definition of the 13 dwelling-specific variables and the 17 city specific
amenity variables is given in Table 1 in Appendix. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the
price and variables. We complete this description with a few additional comments on some of
the public goods variables.
<Insert Table 2 here>
3.2.1 Education variables
As mentioned in introduction, we use two variables to measure the quality of local public schools.
The variable Peer is defined as the fraction of the total number of children registered in the
three last years of junior high school who are at least two years behind their normal grade level
(as determined by their birth rate). Assuming (plausibly given the uniform norms implemented
by the French ministry of education) that the pass/failure policy of local school authorities
does not exhibit systematic cross-city variations, this indicator measures the fraction of ‘poorly
performing’ peers that a given child will interact with on a daily basis in a local public junior high
school. It is an institutional particularity of the public school french system which motivates
9 It should moreover be noticed that, in France, the average size of the city is much smaller than in the US
(the average city of our sample is only 7,4 Km2) For this reason, one may expect the inaccuracy of measuring
amenities at the city level rather than at the neighborhood one to be less severe in France than there would be in
the US.
12
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our choice of the second year of the junior high school as the benchmark year to calculate the
fraction of poorly performing peers. As explained by Cousin (1996; p. 60) the second year of
junior high school is typically perceived to be the first year where failure is recognized to be
a good method for sending to the pupil (or to the parents) a signal that can help in future
orientation decisions (choosing a more applied school curriculum for instance). Hence until the
first year of junior high school, parents have the right to object to a possible proposal of failure of
their child made by the school authorities at the end of the year. Starting from the second year
of junior high school, parents loose this opportunity. Interestingly enough, in other regressions
not included in this present version, we have considered an alternative specification where the
quality of peers is measured by the number of children registered in the first year who are at
least two years backward. It turns out that the estimated coeﬃcient of this second indicator
of peer group eﬀect (which exhibits only a modest correlation of 0.23 with the variable Peer)
presents the wrong sign. It appears, therefore, that it is not the appropriate variable to measure
the quality of the peers with whom the pupil interacts.
The second variable is the standard Student/teacher ratio calculated, for each city and
year, on all public junior high-schools to which city resident are assigned by the public school
zoning system. This variable is obviously a good proxy for the physical input of the human
capital production function. One may notice on Table 2 that this variable exhibits very little
variation across cities and years due to the egalitarian norms implemented by the french central
authorities. The pupil/teacher ratios in junior high schools range from 21.9 to 27.1, with more
than 85% of the observations lying between 24 and 26.5. It should be noted that Student/teacher
is (slightly) negatively correlated with Peer (around 0.25) as well as with the variable that
measure poverty (0.41) in the city (see below). This suggests that the national public school
13
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authorities allocate inputs across public schools in a way which partially attempt to compensate
the unequal distribution of sociological characteristics across cities.(see also Trancart (1998; p.
49) for more evidence on this).
3.2.2 Accessibility
We consider three variables that aim at capturing the accessibility of the city in which the
dwelling is located. Two variables, Ptransport and Ctransport, measure the time (in minutes)
required to commute from each of the 33 cities to Paris center at morning rush hour using,
respectively, public transportation and car transportation. Both variables are computed using
information available in 1996.10
Both Ptransport and Ctransport are intended to measure the time required to commute
from home to work. This rests on the “monocentric” assumption that most inhabitants of Val
d’Oise work in the center of Paris. Although this assumption is not strictly true, it is worth
keeping in mind that 40% of the jobs available in the Paris greater metropolitan area are located
10Commuting time by public transportation is calculated from the various networks of public transportation
of the greater Paris metropolitan area (bus, suburban train, RER, and metro) using the oﬃcial schedule of the
public transportation companies (essentially the RATP and the SNCF) for the morning rush hour (7:00-9:00).
This commuting time is the shortest that can be achieved when considering all possible combinations of itineraries.
It includes the average time taken to commute (by car if necessary) from the various point of the city where the
housing is built to the nearest access to the public transport network (train or RER station or bus depot) and
the waiting time if any. Destination of commuting is assumed to be the subway and RER station of Chatelet-les
Halles in the center of Paris.
Commuting time by car results from simulations performed on the road network of the Paris greater metropoli-
tan area at morning rush hour. Times are computed under the assumption that the driver takes the fastest route
to connect the center of the city where he or she lives to Chatelet train station. It also includes the time required
to park the car.
14
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in the inner Paris, and that 22% of the inhabitants of Val d’Oise who work do so in the center
of Paris. It should also be noticed that, for historical reasons, the transportation network in
France (both public and private) is concentrically organized around the city center of Paris.
Many people who commute between two points of the Paris greater metropolitan area must
make an interconnection in the city center of Paris. For this reason the commuting time from
home to the city center of Paris does capture a significant part of the commuting time of a much
larger portion of the Val d’Oise workers than 22%.
One could of course question the use of two distinct variables to capture what is often
perceived as a single phenomenon: the time taken to commute from home to work. Such a
questioning is legitimate since, in each of the 33 cities covered in our sample, commuting time by
public transportation is smaller than commuting time by car. If the time spent in commuting
by car and the time spent in commuting by public transportation were perfect substitutes,
commuting time by car would not be valued at all by the housing market. Pushed at the limit,
if the two commuting times were perfect substitutes, one would not observe any inhabitant of the
Val d’Oise on the road network at the morning rush hours! As a matter of facts, the proportion
of pure car users among the commuters from the outer ring of the metropolitan area of Paris
(to which the Val d’Oise belongs) to Paris is only 19%11. Hence 81% of these commuters use at
least once the public transportation system on some segment of the trip. Nonetheless, the fact
that a significant portion of commuters do use the car despite the time diﬀerence suggest that
the two transportation times are not perfect substitute. For this reason, we have chosen to keep
them both in the regression. Keeping constant commuting time by public transportation, one
11The number comes from “Enquête globale transports”, Syndicat des Transports Parisiens, 1997. This figure
is diﬀerent from those presented in the introduction which concern all commuters and not only those ones who
from the suburbs commute to Paris.
15
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could therefore expect a priori a positive impact of a marginal reduction of commuting time by
car on dwelling prices.
Although commuting from home to work is an important component of the individuals’
daily transportation activity, it is not the only one. People also commute to go shopping, to go
in vacation, to visit friends and relatives, etc. Not all of these commuting are oriented toward
the city center of Paris. To account for other transportation facilities oﬀered by the dwelling
localization, we also use as a regressor the distance between the center of the city in which the
housing is built and the nearest (in kilometer) freeway entrance (ACmotorway). We interpret
this variable as a proxy for the accessibility of the dwelling in terms of overall road transportation.
It might be thought that the proximity of a freeway, albeit convenient in terms of transportation
facilities, can also be a source of pollution and noise. To account for this, we also introduce
among the regressors the number of kilometers of highway that cross the area of the city in
which the housing is built relative to the size of the city (Rnuisance). Hence the derivative of
the housing price with respect to ACmotorway measures the marginal willingness to pay of the
dwelling’s owner for improving access to the freeway system, given the density of this highway
system in the city where the dwelling is located.
3.2.3 Environmental variables
In addition to Rnuisance which would fit naturally in this category, we have introduced the
physical distance between the center of the city and Roissy’s international airport which bounds
the Val d’Oise on the east side. This variable (DistRoissy) captures the (noise) nuisance
associated with the geographic proximity of the airport.
Also considered are three variables that are intended to capture the aesthetic characteristics
16
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of the site on which the dwelling is located. One of this variable (Scenic) measures the length
of scenic roads (expressed in meters relative to the area of the city) as recorded on a local
Michelin touristic map (under the label “picturesque stretch of road”).12 We also have a variable
(Elevation) that is defined by the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest point of the
city relative to the city’s (horizontal) area. Paris’ region is rather flat and, for this reason,
hills are much appreciated by residents. Finally, the last environmental variable (Green) is the
fraction of the city land opened to recreational activities (that is, free from agriculture, road,
and building).
The variable Monuments on the other hand, which measures, relative to the city’s area, the
number of historical buildings belonging to the national heritage, is intended to be a proxy for
some aesthetic unmeasured “charm” of the city. Finally, the variable Shopping, defined as the
number of detailed shops per 10000 inhabitants, captures the access to commercial facilities.
3.2.4 Public goods and Taxes
Two variables gathered under this heading aim at capturing proximity of the dwelling to various
intrinsically valuable public equipment (Auditoria, Playgrounds) which are mainly financed by
local budgets.
High taxes are the usual counterpart of a generous public good provision even though local
taxes are less tightly connected to local public good provision in France than they are in the
United States. There are two local taxes paid by households in France: A tax on real estate (taxe
sur le foncier bati) (REtax) paid only by the owner of the housing and a so-called dwelling tax
(taxe d’habitation) (Dtax) paid by the household who lives in the dwelling (be it as landlord or as
12The map used is the 1998 edition of the Michelin map no.101 (outskirt of Paris: 1cm = 530 metres).
17
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tenant).13 Each of these two taxes is collected by applying a tax rate, chosen by the local public
administration, to a dwelling-specific administrative tax base that bears no clear relationship with
the dwelling’s market value.14Since we do not observe tax liabilities, we proceed by regressing
housing on the two tax rates (along with the other housing characteristics). Although not
completely pure from a theoretical point of view, this procedure enables us nonetheless to account
to some extent for the capitalization of the taxes in the housing value. Furthermore our knowledge
of the sample average administrative tax base provides an indirect way of testing the degree of
tax capitalization. More specifically, our procedure enable us to check if the estimated hedonic
price of either tax rate corresponds to a capitalization of the future taxes liabilities brought
about by a marginal increase in the tax rates evaluated at average value of the administrative
tax base. Assuming that a purchaser of a unit of housing expects a marginal increases in the
current tax rate to remain in eﬀect for ever, this procedure enables us in eﬀect to infer the
implicit discount rate used by the household to calculate the present value of its future tax
liabilities. This ‘revealed’ discount rate can then be compared with the discount rate used in the
literature to test explicitly for tax capitalization.
3.2.5 Sociological and neighborhood variables
The variable Poverty is defined as the fraction of the households living in the city who are
exempt from the (national) income tax. This variable is interpreted as a proxy for factors that
enter into the production of several public goods supplied by a city and which may be correlated
with some of the public goods. The problem with an empirical specification such as (3) below
is that it neglects many public goods by putting them in the error term εj . Yet these omitted
13A household who owns the housing in which it lives pays both taxes.
14See Acosta and Renard (1993, p. 57 and 127) for more details.
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characteristics are likely to be correlated with the amenities integrated in the empirical analysis.
The reason for this is that many local public goods of a given city (observed and unobserved)
are produced by a set of common production factors. An example of factors that enter jointly
in the production of several public goods is the distribution of sociological attributes (poverty
rate, average income, average level of education, etc.) within the population of a particular city.
Typically, one would expect cities with favorable distribution of sociological attributes to exhibit
better performance in terms of public safety, school success, quality of the neighborhood, etc.
than cities with less favorable distributions of these attributes. The fraction of the households
who are free from income tax liabilities is therefore interpreted as summary statistics for the
distribution of sociological traits.
We also test a crime variable but it turned out to have no significant impact on housing
prices. The weakness of the influence of crime on housing price is common in many hedonic
studies (see for instance Lynch and Rasmussen (2001)). It appears therefore that city is not the
appropriate level of measurement of criminal acts.
3.3 Results
The results obtained from estimating (3) with the independent variables of table 1 are presented
in Table 3.
<Insert table 3 here>
The best functional form for the hedonic price function is obtained for λ = −0.1287. As
indicated by the value of the likelihood ratio test, this functional form is significantly diﬀerent
from the linear (λ = 1) or the log-linear (λ = 0) form. In accordance with the prediction of the
theoretical urban hedonic literature (see e.g. Anderson (1985) and Sheppard (1999)), it implies
19
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an overall convexity of the hedonic price function with respect to the housing characteristics (in
particular, marginal willingness to pay for a given characteristic is increasing with respect to
the quantity of this characteristic).
As can be noticed, all housing characteristics behave in an a priori predictable way.
Focusing on public amenities variables, we first notice that, on these 17 variables, 16 are
significant at the 1% confidence level and 1 at the 5% (student/teacher ratio). All in all, the 25
variables used in our model account for 82% of the variance of the transformed housing price.
Table 4 gives the empirical estimates of hedonic prices for the urban amenities.15 They
correspond to the partial derivative of the hedonic price function in the case of continuous
variables, and to the discrete price diﬀerence in the case of discrete variables at the average
housing of the sample. Table 4 also gives, for all variables expressed in continuous units, the
absolute value of the“hedonic elasticity” of the amenity measured at the average housing (the
percentage variation in housing price brought about by a one percent variation in the amenity).
<Insert table 4 here>
For school variables, one notices that both are significant. The estimated marginal willingness
to pay for reducing by one point the fraction of poorly performing peers at school is 255 C= (or
1417 C= per point of standard deviation). Reducing class size by one pupil is valued 854 C= by
the owner of the average housing of our sample (or 785 C= per point of standard deviation) .
Summing these two eﬀects, we obtain that the owner of the average housing is willing to pay
some 2200 C= for reducing by one point of standard deviation the two indicators of school quality
considered herein. This should be compared with the marginal willingness to pay of 3948 $
for a 1 point of standard deviation amelioration in test score at primary schools obtained by
15Hedonic prices for private characteristics can be provided upon request.
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Black (1999) in wealthy suburbs of Boston. We should mention also that, when interpreted in
a human capital perspective, these figures suggest that the impact of poorly performing peers
and/or student/teacher ratio on the (future) human capital of the child is modest. Take for
instance the 1417 C= that the owner of the average household is willing to pay for reducing
by one point of standard deviation the fraction of poorly performing peers that its child will
encounter at public high schools. Assuming that this amount corresponds to the actualization
at a discount rate of 3.5% of future earning losses brought about by such an exposure to “bad
peers” and that the active life starts at 25 and ends at 65, such a hedonic price is consistent
with a yearly earning loss of... 65.3 C=.
Transportation variables provide interesting results. Reducing either car or public trans-
portation time by one minute increases housing price. The value of reducing by one minute the
time taken to reach the city center of Paris is higher for public transportation than car (345
€ by public transportation, 276 € by car) but the diﬀerence is not statistically significant. An
interesting exercise is to estimate the value of an elementary unit of time revealed by the hedonic
price of Ptransport. Assuming that an average working individual will commute 230 days per
year forever, and using a discount rate of 3.5%, the hedonic price of 345 € associated with a one
minute reduction in commuting time is consistent with a value of the minute of some 5 cents (3
€ for an hour). This figure, which is about half the net French minimum wage rate, suggests
either that the discount rate used is too low or that individuals tend to consider that commut-
ing time has less disutility than the time spent to work. The convexity of the hedonic price
function entails that the marginal willingness to pay is decreasing at a decreasing rate, which
is consistent with the predictions of classical models of the monocentric city. If the generalized
transportation cost (pecuniary and time cost) is linear or concave with respect to the distance to
21
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the central business district (CBD), then the equilibrium market rent curves are strictly convex
with respect to the distance to the CBD (see e.g. Fujita (1999 p. 57)). This interpretation
must of course be taken with a grain of salt since the convexity observed here concerns to the
commuting time, while the prediction of the theory is about the physical distance.
Another interesting result is the significant hedonic price of 857 euros attached to a one
kilometer reduction in the distance from the nearest freeway entrance (given the density of the
highway network in the city where the dwelling is built). The significant hedonic price of 1881
euros attached to a kilometer reduction in the density of this network (given the distance from
the nearest freeway entrance) is even more interesting. It reveals that the nuisance created by
highway (given access) is more important (in absolute value) than the benefit which results from
improving access (given nuisance).
Living one kilometer away from Roissy airport increases the value of the average housing by
some 275 euros.
The four environmental and geographical variables Scenic, Elevation, Green, andMonuments
are significant but their contribution to price seems rather modest.16
The hedonic price of adding one auditorium in the (virtual) city in which the average dwelling
is built (4105 euros, roughly 4 % of the price of the average housing) might look high at first
glance. It is diﬃcult to believe that it is the representative dwelling purchaser’s intrinsic prefer-
ence for music, theatres, etc. which accounts for a willingness to pay of 4105 euros just to live
16For these variables, we compute the hedonic price associated with an increase of the numerator of the variable
equal to one unit (with the exception of Elevation for which we consider an increase of the numerator equal to
10 meters). So we have the hedonic price of one more kilometer of scenic roads in the (virtual) city in which the
average dwelling is built (or the hedonic price of one more hectar of green space or of an additional monument).
We use the same method of computation for the variables Auditoria and Playgrounds.
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in a city which possesses one more show room than the average city. A possible explanation is
that the fact for a city to have or not an auditorium is a proxy for other unmeasured amenities.
This explanation finds some support in the fact that more than one half of the cities covered by
our sample (precisely, 19 out of 33) do not have any auditorium.
An interesting result is the strong capitalization eﬀect of local tax rates. For increasing by
one point the dwelling tax rate (resp. the real estate tax rate) leads to a reduction of 773 euros
(resp. 718 euros) in the value of the average housing unit. In terms of the earlier discussion,
if we apply the tax rates on a unit of housing of average administrative value, and under the
assumption that a one point increase in the tax rate is expected by the household to last forever,
our average estimate of the negative capitalization of 773 euros (resp. 718) reveals a discount rate
of 3.7% (resp. 3.2%). The diﬀerence between the two rates is not statistically significant. These
figures fall down a plausible confidence interval of the actual real interest rates on mortgage
loans observed for that period; In terms of Palmon and Smith’s (1998) methodology, these
results indicate a full capitalization of taxes at a real discount rate of 3.5%. They suggest the
existence of an almost complete “Laﬀer eﬀect”. If tax authorities were to base their local tax
rate on the market (rather than administrative) value of the housing, then increasing tax rates
would have virtually no eﬀect on the expected future government tax revenues.
4 Policy implications of the results
In this section, we show how, under specific assumptions, hedonic prices of public goods provide
exact measures of their social marginal values and we use our hedonic estimates to evaluate some
public programs aimed at reducing school failure in poor cities. We first recall the condition under
which the sum of hedonic prices for a public good taken over the inhabitants of a particular city
23
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provides an exact measure of the social value attached by the population of the city for a small
improvement in the available quantity of this public good.
Assume that there are H households who make the same decision as that of the represen-
tative household examined in section 2 (indexing by i ∈ {1, ...,H} their utility functions and
consumption sets and denoting by byi the wealth of household i). All these households face
the same hedonic price function h(.). Since every household’s optimal choice of characteristics
package depends upon wealth only (given h(·)), we define household i’s indirect utility function
Vi : R+ → R+ with image vi by
Vi(byi) = max
(c,x)
Ui(c, x)
subject to x+ h(c) ≤ byi and (c, x) ∈ X
Assume now that the distribution of incomes across households is considered optimal with respect
to the social evaluation function S : RH+ → R+ defined by
S(y1, ..., yH) =W (V1(y1), ..., VN(yH))
where W : RH+ → R+ is a continuously diﬀerentiable and increasingly monotonic Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function. This assumption amounts to asserting that observed (by1, ..., byH)
are (interior) solutions of the following program
max
y1,...,yH
S(y1, ..., yH) subject to
HX
i=1
yi ≤
HX
i=1
byi (P)
and, therefore, satisfy first order conditions
∂W (V1(by1), ..., VN(byH))
∂vi
∂Vi(byi)
∂yi
=
∂W (V1(by1), ..., VN(byH))
∂vl
∂Vi(byl)
∂yl
= λ
for every household i and l where λ is some real non-negative constant (the Lagrange-Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier associated to the constraint in the program (P)).
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Assume that we want to evaluate the social value of a “small” project consisting in an
increment of dck in the quantity of the amenity k in some city j. Letting Hj denoting the
number of households who optimally choose to locate in city j, the social value ∆W of such a
project at households’s initial optimal choice is approximated by
∆W =
HjX
i=1
∂W (V1(by1), ..., VN (byN))
∂vi
∂Ui(c∗i , x
∗
i )
∂ck
dck
From the first order conditions of households maximization programs, this can be written as
∆W =
HjX
i=1
∂W (V1(by1), ..., VN(byN ))
∂vi
∂V i(byi)
∂yi
∂h(c∗i , x
∗
i ))
∂ck
dck
which, given the optimality of income distribution and ordinality of social welfare measurement,
amounts to
∆W =
HjX
i=1
∂h(c∗i , x
∗
i ))
∂ck
dck
In a continuous context with optimal distribution of incomes therefore, summing the implicit
marginal prices of local public goods produced by a “small” project over all occupied housings
built in the location where the project is implemented provides an exact measure of the so-
cial value of the project. It is worth emphasizing the strength of the condition that observed
households incomes are optimally distributed with respect to the same social welfare function
as that used to appraise the value of public projects. This condition amounts to using in project
evaluation the same ethics as that who considers the actual income distribution to be “just” (or
socially optimal). This particular ethic may not command widespread support.
<Insert table 5 about here>
Given this proviso, we can apply this formula and compute the social benefit that a reduction
of one unit in some local public good could bring about in the cities. We do this in table 5 for the
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variable Peer in a few poor cities of Val d’Oise in which the French Ministry of the city aﬀairs
has launched a large expenditure program. Column 3 in table 5, evaluates the sum of marginal
willingness to pay for a one point reduction in peers taken over all landlords of every concerned
city. These benefits, although significant, underestimate the total benefits that the inhabitants
of the city would obtain out of the policy since they take no account of households who do not
own their housing.17 These figures can be compared with the government capital spending in
these cities for local public schools that appear in column 4. It is of course diﬃcult to appraise
these figures without further information on the technology used by the government to convert
public fund into reduction of behind grade levelness at school. However, and unless we assume
an extremely high rate of conversion of government money into reduction of school failure, we
must recognize that government spending is very modest in most of the cities with respect to our
estimation of the benefits aimed. Column 5 and 6 make the same kind of comparison in annual
terms using the discounted rate revealed by the capitalization of tax rate in our empirical model.
Here again, government spending seems modest relative to our estimation of the benefits.
5 Conclusion
This study reveals a few noticeable facts. In Paris metropolitan area, dwelling prices appear to
be sensitive to both public and car transportation. At a discount rate of 3.5%, the willingness
to pay of the owner of the average housing of our sample for reducing marginally her commuting
time to work is consistent with an hourly value of this owner’s time of some 3 euros, a figure
17On the other hand, it is worth recalling that housing prices used in this study are supply prices and not
transaction prices. It is also probably worth recalling that these figures are obtained from the sale (rather than
the renting) market. These two states of aﬀairs suggest an overestimation of the marginal willingness to pay.
26
Page 27 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
that is much lower than the value of the minimum wage for the reference years. The second
important results revealed by our study is the clear capitalization of local taxes. Furthermore,
our empirical results support the view that the quality of local public schools aﬀects significantly
housing price. It appears that both objective inputs and peer group eﬀects aﬀects significantly
house price when control is made for other neighborhood variables such as the poverty rate.
The importance of the estimates of the social marginal value of avoidance of bad peer is worth
stressing. In an average city counting 25000 landlords, a policy leading to a reduction of one
percent in the number of children who fail at school has a social marginal value of some 6.375
million of euros.
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Figure 1: Map of Val d’Oise 
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Table 1: Variable Description 
 
A) Private variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
Price price of the housing 
divided by a price index  
continuous (euros) free newspapers adds 
Second room 
 
whether or not the housing 
has a second room 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Third room 
 
whether or not the housing 
has a third room 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Fourth room 
 
whether or not the housing 
has a fourth room 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Fifth room 
 
whether or not the housing 
has a fifth room 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Sixth room 
 
whether or not the housing 
has a sixth room 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Another room number of rooms above 6 discrete  
 
free newspapers adds 
Balcony whether or not the housing 
has a balcony 
dummy free newspapers adds  
Kitchen whether or not the housing 
has an equipped kitchen 
dummy  free newspapers adds  
Parking whether or not the housing 
has a parking  
dummy free newspapers adds 
House whether or not the housing 
is a house or an apartment 
in a collective building 
dummy free newspapers adds 
Basement whether or not the housing 
has a basement 
dummy free newspapers adds  
Garden  whether or not the housing 
has a garden 
dummy free newspapers adds  
Garden size 
 
size of the garden   continuous (m2) free newspapers adds 
 
F) Education variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
Peer fraction of the high school 
pupils who are at least two 
years backward in the 
three last years of high 
school 
percent (average over 
the public schools in the 
city) 
Ministry of education 
Pupils/teacher 
 
average number of pupils 
per class in public high 
schools 
percent (average over 
the public schools in the 
city) 
Ministry of education 
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B) Accessibility 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
Ptransport 
 
time taken by public 
transportation to commute 
between the city center 
and the center of Paris in 
the morning rush hour 
Minutes I.A.U.R.I.F (96) 
Ctransport time taken to commute by 
car between the city and 
the center of Paris in the 
morning rush hour 
Minutes I.A.U.R.I.F (96) 
ACmotorway distance between the city 
center and the nearest 
freeway entrance 
Km computation by the 
authors 
 
C) Environmental and geographic variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
DistRoissy distance between the city 
and Roissy airport 
km computation by the 
authors 
Rnuisance lenght of the highway 
network relative to the city 
territory 
km/km squared computation by the 
authors 
Scenic lenght of scenic roads 
relative to the area of the 
city 
km/ km squared Michelin’s map, ed.1998, 
n.101 
Elevation difference between the 
highest and the lowest 
point in the city relative to 
the area of the city 
m/m squared computation by the 
authors 
Green hectares of the city land 
open to public as natural 
space relative to the area 
of the city 
percent Inventaire des terrains 
ouverts au public, Val 
d’Oise 
I.A.U.R.I.F 1990 
Monuments Number of historical 
buildings per km squared 
continous  Inventaire Communal 
INSEE 1998  
Shopping number of salaried 
workers in retail stores per 
10000 inhabitants 
continous Unemployment Insurance 
office of the Paris 
Metropolitan Area 
 
E) Public goods and taxes 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
Auditoria number of auditoria per 
10000 inhabitants 
continous National census (1981 and 
1990) 
Playgrounds number of playgrounds 
per 10000 inhabitants 
continous National census (1981 and 
1990) 
REtax rate of the tax on real 
estate 
percent of  the 
administrative value of 
the housing 
Tax authorities 
Dtax rate of the dwelling tax percent of  the 
administrative value of 
the housing 
Tax authorities 
 
G) Sociological and neighborhood variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of measurement Source 
Poverty fraction of households 
who do not pay income 
taxes 
percent Tax authorities 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the variables
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
House's price 112380.40 64795.62 12195.92 666202.20
Second room 0.964 0.185 0 1
Third room 0.885 0.318 0 1
Fourth room 0.682 0.465 0 1
Fifth room 0.396 0.489 0 1
Sixth room 0.163 0.369 0 1
Another room 0.084 0.412 0 6
Equipped kitchen 0.337 0.472 0 1
Parking 0.656 0.474 0 1
Balcony 0.274 0.446 0 1
House 0.555 0.496 0 1
Basement 0.580 0.493 0 1
Garden 0.384 0.486 0 1
Garden size 186.49 320.79 0 5700
Peer 17.99 5.55 6.37 36.47
Student/teacher 25.15 0.909 21.94 27.11
Ptransport 45.86 10.56 31 76
Ctransport 96.42 9.76 79 124
Acmotorway 3.430 2.78 0.885 13
Rnuisance 0.259 0.211 0 0.721
DistRoissy 26.74 10.11 6 45
Scenic 0.082 0.109 0 0.381
Elevation 0.103 0.085 0 0.304
Green 9.07 11.83 0.078 57.11
Monuments 0.210 0.429 0 2.37
Shopping 66.78 42.57 14.55 282.79
Auditoria 0.288 0.395 0 1.45
Playgrounds 0.841 0.774 0 3.88
Retax 15.15 4.87 6.49 28.22
Dtax 12.15 2.45 6.41 19.3
Poverty 33.67 6.91 20.7 55.24
Year1986 0.102 0.303 0 1
Year1987 0.117 0.321 0 1
Year1988 0.110 0.313 0 1
Year1989 0.116 0.321 0 1
Year1990 0.126 0.332 0 1
Year1991 0.110 0.313 0 1
Year1992 0.100 0.301 0 1
Year1993 0.106 0.308 0 1
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Table 3: Estimation Results
Lambda -0.128** 0.011 -0.151 -0.106
C 5.917** 0.310 5.307 6.526
Second room 0.066** 0.009 0.048 0.085
Third room 0.049** 0.007 0.036 0.063
Fourth room 0.034** 0.005 0.024 0.044
Fifth room 0.034** 0.005 0.024 0.044
Sixth room 0.032** 0.005 0.022 0.043
Another room 0.023** 0.003 0.016 0.031
Equipped kitchen 0.017** 0.002 0.012 0.023
Parking 0.017** 0.002 0.011 0.022
Balcony 0.011** 0.002 0.007 0.016
House 0.043** 0.006 0.031 0.055
Basement 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.007
Garden 0.006** 0.002 0.002 0.010
Garden size 0.00006** 0.00001 0.00004 0.00008
Peer -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002
Student/teacher -0.002* 0.0008 -0.003 -0.0003
Ptransport -0.0008** 0.0001 -0.001 -0.0004
Ctransport -0.0006** 0.0002 -0.001 -0.0002
Acmotorway -0.002** 0.0004 -0.002 -0.001
Rnuisance -0.032** 0.005 -0.043 -0.020
DistRoissy 0.0006** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0009
Scenic 0.029** 0.009 0.010 0.048
Elevation 0.039** 0.011 0.016 0.062
Green 0.0002** 0.00009 0.00004 0.0004
Monuments 0.008** 0.002 0.004 0.012
Shopping 0.0001** 0.00002 0.00008 0.0001
Auditoria 0.023** 0.003 0.015 0.031
Playgrounds 0.004** 0.001 0.002 0.006
Retax -0.001** 0.0003 -0.002 -0.001
Dtax -0.001** 0.0004 -0.002 -0.0009
Poverty -0.001** 0.0002 -0.002 -0.001
Year1986 0.025** 0.004 0.017 0.034
Year1987 0.050** 0.007 0.035 0.064
Year1988 0.075** 0.010 0.054 0.096
Year1989 0.108** 0.015 0.078 0.138
Year1990 0.136** 0.019 0.099 0.174
Year1991 0.148** 0.020 0.107 0.189
Year1992 0.146** 0.020 0.106 0.186
Year1993 0.138** 0.019 0.100 0.176
Number of observations    8192
Log likelihood   -93428.6
Test H0 Restricted lgL  χ²(1) Pr> χ²
Lambda = -1   -99565.396   5513.25    0.000
Lambda = 0 -93491.246 125.31 0.000
Lambda = 1 -97670.453 8483.73 0.000
**  Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level
*  Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level
 Variable  Coef. Std. Err.  95% Conf. Interval
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Table 4: Hedonic Price of Urban Amenities
Variable name Hedonic price 
(Euros)
Elasticity 
(%)
Peer 255 0.0659
Student/teacher 854 0.2212
Ptransport 345 0.1631  
Ctransport 276 0.2744
Acmotorway 857 0.0302
Rnuisance 1881 0.0050
DistRoissy 275 0.0756
Scenic 168 0.0001
Elevation 225 0.0002
Green 98 0.0091
Monuments 482 0.001
Shopping 59 0.0404
Auditoria 4105 0.0121
Playgrounds 733 0.0063
REtax 718 0.1119
Dtax 773 0.0967
Poverty 670 0.2322
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Table 5: Cost-Benefit Comparisons of Public Spending for Reducing School Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% of owners    
1990 census
Number of 
housing units   
1990 census
Total benefit of a 
permanent reduction of 
school failure by 1 
point (in thousand of 
euros)
Total public spending 
including capital 
expenditures 1993 (in 
thousand of euros)
Annual benefit of a 
reduction of school 
failure by 1 point (in 
thousand of euros)
Public spending 
excluding capital 
expenditure  1993 (in 
thousand of euros)
· Argenteuil 43% 34113 3520 3441 123 77
· Bezons 44% 9423 1040 980 36 25
· Garges les Gonnesses 34% 12842 820 2640 29 75
· Goussainville 58% 7940 1349 1464 47 33
· Persan 36% 3402 2645 1251 93 14
· Saint Ouen l’Aumône 43% 6101 553 927 19 16
· Sarcelles 33% 17607 1237 1407 43 42
· Villiers le Bel 39% 9102 656 1182 23 45
Total - - 11820 13291 414 327
(1) (2) :   INSEE CENSUS 1990
      (3) :   (1)x (2)x MWP for the city 
(4) (6) :   Financial appendix : Town contract 1994-1998 Sources : Mission-Ville Département du Val d'Oise
      (5) :   (3)x 0.035 
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